Tariff man strikes back, or the phantom trade war?

Paul Diggle: Hello, and welcome to Macro Bytes the economics and politics podcast from abrdn. My name is Paul Diggle.

Luke Bartholomew: And I'm Luke Bartholomew.

Paul: Luke and I are joined in this conversation by James McCann, who leads US coverage. Bob Gillhooly, who he who leads our China coverage, and Lizzy Galbraith, who leads our political coverage. So, investors can be forgiven for having tariff whiplash from the rapid unfolding of announcements from the Trump administration in recent days. First, President Trump announced 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and an additional 10% tariff on China. Then the Mexican and later Canadian tariffs were postponed following direct calls with Claudia Sheinbaum, Justin Trudeau in which those leaders said they would move troops to their borders with the US to crack down on illegal immigration and fentanyl flows. And then the China tariffs have seemingly gone ahead with retaliation from China on the US as well. So, we're recording this on February the 4th. More could have changed by the time you listen to the podcast. But what we want to do today is step back and think through whether the model for understanding tariff policy under the Trump administration is going to look more like the events with Canada and Mexico. That is to say, is all about creating negotiating leverage, and actual tariff rates might not even go up all that much in the end, because Trump will be offered wins from other countries. Or whether the appropriate model should be more like the China situation, where sustained tariff increases are going to occur as the global trading system fractures. We're also going to talk about how the economic consequences of all that could play out. How the Federal Reserve and other central banks might negotiate those uncertainties. So, Lizzy let's start with you. As I said, we're talking on Tuesday afternoon. Obviously, there has been a whirlwind of announcements on the trade policy front, but why don't you tell us how they started? What were the original announcements over the weekend from the Trump administration? And under what auspices, using what powers did Trump make those policy announcements – because I think they're going to provide clues about how the White House might pursue future trade policy.

Lizzy Galbraith: Yeah. So actually, I think the story begins even further back than the weekend in that Trump has been talking about levying 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and this 10% tariff on China for some months. Now, this goes back to the campaign trail in lots of ways. So I think the first key thing here is that this was largely something that Trump said he was going to do while he was campaigning, and he did then take steps to follow through on it this weekend. So, as we said, over the weekend, Trump, made the announcement, having flagged that the 1st of February was the key date when tariffs would be imposed, saying that he was going to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to implement these tariffs on the US's largest trading partners. The use of that act is really quite important here. It's the first time it's ever been attempted. Previous presidents have used predecessor acts here to to implement blanket tariffs, Nixon being the most recent example of that. But the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or IEEPA has never actually been been used to implement tariffs before. It would allow very instantaneous tariffs, and it would also allow the president, crucially, to circumvent Congress in this area. It allows for very quick implementation of tariffs if it is used, although, it's probably, if it was went ahead with at this stage you may well have seen some legal action to test whether or not the act was being used in its intended form. So still some uncertainties there over how this act is being used by, by President Trump. But I think the takeaway here is (a) follow through on an established promise. He'd been very clear about the plans that he had the tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China. And (b) he use this act, which allowed the very quick implementation, if he had actually followed through on those threats fully.

Luke: And so bringing the story up to date, then let's talk about responses, concessions and retaliation. And Lizzy, starting with you, I mean, what is it that Mexico and Canada have offered to Trump to postpone these tariffs?

Lizzy: So, the big issues that Trump had stated that he was trying to solve here, were the fentanyl trade, in particular, this was an issue that he'd cited in the tariffs against all three countries. And then particularly with regards to to Mexico and Canada, illegal border crossings, were cited as well. So in the case of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum had a call with Trump, relatively early in the day, and committed to deploying 10,000 National Guard troops at the US-Mexico border. This isn't necessarily, you know, an unprecedented concession. Mexico has previously done this troop deployment to improve border security. And she's also made some unspecified so far points around improving the trading relationship. And there seems to be plans to have some sort of US /Mexican delegation meets to discuss this further at some point in the months before the new tariff imposition date of the 4th of March. On the Canadian side, Justin Trudeau had in December in advance of these these tariffs being implemented, announced a 1.3 billion Canadian dollar border enforcement strategy designed to try and address some of the concerns that Trump had. And then yesterday, he also announced that he would appoint a fentanyl ‘czar’ to try and address the the border situation more forcefully and topped up that funding package by an additional 200 million CAD to launch a Canada U.S. Joint Strike Force to counter organized crime across the border. So, interestingly, I think particularly on the Canadian side, actually, he didn't go too much further than, than what had already been announced. The bulk of the the major concessions had already been been made, but nonetheless, we've now moved into a position where the new tariff imposition date for for Canada and Mexico is 4th of March. That is now pending further negotiation between both countries and the United States on a more longstanding package of measures. And in the the Chinese case, the tariffs have already obviously been implemented. And so far there hasn't been any concession on the Chinese side to try and alleviate those tariffs. And in fact, the Chinese have actually responded with measures of their own, although we do know that there is going to be a phone call between President Trump and Xi at a later date. So there may well be some movement there. In the coming days. But for now at least, less movements on the US / China side compared to Canada and Mexico.

Luke: Well, picking up on that point then, Bob, I mean, what has China announced so far in terms of retaliation? And we need to think about, you know, what its strategy is in responding to us trade measures.

Bob Gilhooly: Yeah. So China's announced, tariffs ranging from 10 to 15%, across a range of US energy products such as liquefied natural gas, coal, oil, and then its exports of farm equipment. But it's also launched an antitrust investigation into Google. It's put two US corporates onto its unreliable entity list, which is quite akin to a Chinese blacklist. It also announced tighter export controls on various critical minerals such as tungsten, and indium also, but overall, you know, this retaliation seems both kind of fairly measured and also clearly more targeted than the US, blanket 10%. And some aspects are arguably kind of a relatively soft retaliation too. You know, Google's obviously a very high profile, US company but it doesn't operate many services in China. It shut its China search engine back in 2010. It does have an advertising business, and Android OS is fairly common on mobiles, but clearly I think the impact would have been much more material if it, you know, it targeted a US firm with more substantial business interests within China, and minerals are also, you know, they've been targeted, but probably not as critical, as they could have been. Many are actually, you know, reasonably readily accessible for the US from alternative countries. China might be the main source of tungsten for the US, but other imports, minerals such as indium, only about 10% is sourced from China. So overall, you know, I think the strategy does seem to be one of damage limitation. China doesn't seem to want to kind of pour fuel on the fire and risk further actions from from Trump. And also I should say that these actions from China do not come into effect until the 10th of Feb. So there is a window to kind of de-escalate here and pull things back.

Paul: So if they do actually eventually come into force, the Mexico, Canada and China elements of the tariffs would push the US's average weighted tariff rate with the rest of the world up from something like 2% now to perhaps 10% based on some back of the envelope modeling. And even with just the China element in place, perhaps average weighted tariffs are going up from 2% to 4.5% or so. And for context, the previous trade war during the first Trump administration, only increased average tariff rates from what were just about 1% to say 2.5% at their peak. You have to go back to the 70s to see them about 4%. You have to go back to the 1930s to see average US tariffs above 10%. So pretty substantial if they all eventually come into force. But James, the way the rapid deal was knitted together with Mexico and with Canada and then that reversal on tariff increases that seems to point to the idea that Trump's tariff threats really are all about extracting concessions - that that framing of tariffs is largely just a negotiating ploy - is probably also the most market-friendly reading of what Trump is up to on tariff strategy. So what is the best argument as to why that is the model – that's how tariffs will continue to be used by Trump if he introduces them on the EU or other countries, they'll also be about gaining concessions and countries can offer Trump concessions to negotiate away the tariffs. Is that the model? What's the case for it being?

James McCann: Absolutely, I think that is the most market-friendly interpretation. And the case for it is that the US has a lot of leverage with regards to trade negotiations. The US imports around 4 trillion of of goods and services in US dollars each year. That puts it in a very significant position in the global trade trade cycle as a source of intermediate and final demand. And so it's really, really important as a trade partner to many, many economies. It won't come as a huge surprise. So it has, you know, a very large stick to to wield in in these negotiations. But the trouble with wielding that stick is that you can  hurt yourself at times by, by doing so. You can do so as well through a couple of potentially politically sensitive channels. Perhaps most noteworthy is that tariffs can can act like a tax and they can push up the prices of goods and services for US consumers. We know that from recent history, politically, high inflation has been a very sensitive topic. US households reacted very badly to the high inflation experienced during the Biden presidency. And Trump has very successfully campaigned on bringing down inflation. So there's a concern that by using this tariff stick, you could shoot yourself in the foot by raising prices. It obviously has some growth effect as well. Both via that price channel, via business uncertainty, some tightening in financial conditions, but also as US firms have to import or pay higher prices for imports that are then exported, making them less competitive. So it does a little bit of economic damage. It probably all feeds into some market disruptions too. And we know that Donald Trump in particular, has benchmarked how his economic and presidential performance is shaping up based on what the market is doing. So we saw very clearly on Monday that the markets didn't like these tariff announcements. And that's another indication that Trump might be wielding a stick, that he might not like the full consequences of. And then I suppose the other aspect is what is, you know, what is Trump looking to gain through part of these negotiations? So certainly concerns around drug trafficking, you know, and trade fairness, they are important. But with regards to Canada and Mexico, these are countries that are deeply integrated into US supply chains, with which, you know, Trump signed an 1800 page free trade agreement just 4 or 5 years ago - with the USMCA. So, you know, it's not like I think in these cases there are, you know, very deep and well-founded concerns about, you know, these being geopolitical rivals or these engaging in systematically unfair trade practices. So, you know, I think the argument for the market would be that in many cases, you know, this is an example of using this to create political wins, you know, address areas of trade maybe there's discontent with, but actually, you know a desire to stomach genuine economic pain, you know, to try and redress these issues is perhaps not there. And so you might get a lot of bark, but not as much bite to mix my metaphors.

Paul: Yeah. And whereas in the Canadian and Mexican case, the asks from the Trump administration were around immigration and fentanyl, you can imagine that say it comes to the EU the asks there are perhaps on defence spending, the EU should be increasing its defence spending in line with NATO commitments - or perhaps the US’s ask is around technology regulation and other standards. So that there are these issues that Trump and his economic advisors have vis-a-vis their economic relationship with other countries should perhaps give you some encouragement that there is a deal there to be done.

Luke: Although I guess the risk is that that can end up potentially looking a bit complacent. I mean, we've certainly thought that the tariffs on China end up being permanent and indeed go further than what's been announced so far. So Bob, what's the case that the tariff measures end up being more than just negotiating leverage, that this relatively benign reading that we've been setting out does turn out to be a bit complacent. And at some point the announcements do end up sticking?

Bob: Yeah, of course, it's very difficult to know for sure because, you know, noise is very much a feature, not a bug, of what Trump’s strategy has been. But I think there's kind of couple of angles where you could could point to potential complacency. First of all, might be just kind of the rationale, actually, for hitting Canada with tariffs seems pretty weak. You know, migration flows into the US are largely focused at the southern border. Even fentanyl too, you know, the Canadian government’s citing that 99.8% of US fentanyl seizures were on the Mexican side, not the Canadian side. So this could potentially kind of point to some other long run aims say around trade and goods, rebuilding the US manufacturing base, kind of being these like long run goals maybe in addition to drugs and border security. Trump’s certainly had a very, you know, long-standing problem with the US trade deficit. You know, in 1987, he put out full page ads in The New York Times, and Washington Post highlighting Japan taking advantage of the US through unfair trade practices. So potentially, you know, he may just be actually serious about bringing manufacturing jobs home to the US. So there's a risk, I think maybe the tariffs come back on after 30 days or maybe as part of the USMCA review. Alternatively, you know, this could actually be very little about the border security or trade - it could all be about tax, you know, hitting your largest trading partners and in this case, that would be also be your largest revenue sources, could be a means to fund tax cuts, kind of under the guise of righting previous trade-related wrongs.

Paul: Yeah. The migration and fentanyl concerns could be merely the procedural excuses. The way as Lizzy you're outlining that Trump uses executive order to impose the tariffs. And it is indeed really about addressing trade deficits, raising tariff revenue. And I suppose another point is that the vagueness of the asks that Trump has, cut both ways. At times that can make it potentially difficult for countries to deliver against Trump's asks, but at other points it could make it quite easy - as easy as it is to send 10,000 troops to the southern border. But you know, if you provide Trump the win, the optical win, then perhaps we're learning that you can negotiate away the tariffs. James, let's talk a little bit about the economic impact of all this. You started talking about how it would play out in the US economy. Well, let's dive deeper into that. How would you model, how would you think about the US economic impact from tariffs, whether it's the tariffs that do seem to be going ahead with China or a potential future increase in tariffs elsewhere?

James: Yeah, absolutely. I think the framing earlier of tariffs being a tax is a useful one. And of course with taxes the key question is the incident. So who ends up paying that tax. And there's a lot of political debate around this. Is it the US consumers / importers or is it those trying to export into the US. And that's a really complicated question to answer empirically and likely depends on the type, the structure of that particular market and the types of product caught up in it, the breadth of the tariff measures, etc. also the shifts in exchange rates to try and offset some of these dynamics. You know, when we look at the the best range of estimates for what, let's say a 25% tariff across USMCA partners, Mexico and Canada, you know, on top of what Trump has announced on China. You know, I think it's not unreasonable to expect you're putting inflation around half to one percentage point higher. So just to put that into real numbers in all the progress the Fed has made on inflation, that would, you know, reverse a little bit of that. So you'd be moving away from the mid to high twos in core PCE to sort of the mid threes. So obviously a very uncomfortable inflation environment. It would also weigh on growth. You know again difficult I think – but using ranges is quite useful for this. So we might think it would dent growth between 0.2 and 0.8 percentage points off the annual GDP growth rate. So that's something that would, you know, materially shift the feel of the growth environment. But probably you know, it's not something we consider to be consistent with recession - that will come through a range of channels, US firms becoming less competitive, a degree of real income squeeze, some financial markets stress and business uncertainty effects on investment too. So I think it reshapes some of the macro feeling. You know, importantly these are averages across the economy. You'd have, you know, squeezes in particular sectors. So things like fresh food prices would be noticeably higher. Potentially, gasoline prices would be higher. They've been politically sensitive in the past. We know that lumber prices will probably mean that housing construction would be more expensive and the US has a shortfall of homes. So the average numbers wouldn't disguise from the fact that, you know, this would definitely create more severe pinch points across the economy.

Paul: How would, the Federal Reserve, the central bank, think about that combination of a negative growth impact but a positive inflation impact?

James: That’s always a little bit complicated for central banks. And I think traditionally they might see this as a supply style shock which does create that that hit to growth, but also somewhat stronger inflation over a period of time. I think they'd be mindful that the inflation impact should be a one off effect as well. A tariff level effect will have a  temporary impact on the inflation rate but a more permanent impact on the on the price level. So traditionally I think they would have been maybe inclined to, to look through it or perhaps loosen into two aspects of that economic weakness discussed. I think what complicates it is obviously the context. And they've been through a series of supply shocks through the pandemic, and that, alongside strong demand, has meant that US inflation hasn't been at target now for years. The degree of overshoot’s been really material, so that maybe might make them slightly less comfortable to look through or at least ease into aspects of this supply shock, this latest bout of of inflation. It also makes it harder to disentangle. We know we've been debating in these podcasts the extent to which inflation is slowing to target, is sticky, getting stuck. It just adds so much more noise to that question for the Fed too. So yeah, the sense is that they might be looking to to sit on their hands. And you know interestingly that was the hints I think we got from Powell at the press conference, at the most recent Fed meeting. And even at the start of this week, we've had regional Fed presidents come out and indicate they, you know, would want to be waiting and seeing in this environment, both in terms of what was delivered, but also in terms of how those, you know, transmission mechanisms fed through their economy.

Luke: And then thinking about the impact of US tariffs on US trade partners. I guess one reason why the Canadian and Mexican government rushed to try and make a deal with Trump was because of the potentially very adverse economic impacts on their economies. I think the Bank of Canada very helpfully released a quite detailed scenario analysis of the impact of tariffs on the Canadian economy. So, James, do you want to talk a little bit about what that report suggested? And then also you said for the Fed it's a complicated matter, but how does that report help guide how the Bank of Canada is thinking about policy setting in this environment?

James: Yeah, you're right. Very, very helpfully timed. So they released that alongside their monetary policy report last week. Within it it had a scenario in which they imagined a 25% reciprocal tariff rate on imports from the US and exports to the US. Their expectation was that would, broadly speaking, they didn't use these words but just interpreting that the growth numbers would probably be consistent with a small recession in Canada. So the central case thought that that would take 2.5 percentage points off growth. You know, ranges, they thought that was between 2.2 and 3% in the first year. So a really material shock and reflecting again the importance of net trade in that economy being slightly more open than the US. And then the real importance of the US as a source of Canadian exports. Interestingly, on the inflation side, they thought that the impact would be a little more lagged. So they thought actually in year one, the impact on inflation was likely very small. And in some ways that's competing dynamics. So they have weaker growth dampening inflation, also falling commodity prices dampening inflation on that horizon. But also they expected a relatively slow pass through of those higher tariffs to Canadian consumer prices. So you don't really see the impact positively on Canadian inflation until sort of years two and three in that scenario. But it was material. So their central case in year two was that inflation would be half a percentage point higher. Again confidence patterns around that between 0.2 and 1.3. So yeah,as you say Luke, they're facing competing demands on their policy as well. You know I think the fact that the potential impact through the growth channel is both large and potentially front loaded would indicate maybe that they might see that in a more dovish light. And in fact, we got some sense of that last week when, Canadian Central bank caught on and were very clear that part of that move was there to support the economy against the backdrop of threats to its trade position. So, you know, it's possible that this is adding to that sense that, you know, around the whole Trump administration that there's an asymmetry around what it does to central banks, with the Fed being more inclined to perhaps be cautious with interest rate cuts but other central banks feeling the need to maybe be a bit more supportive in the wake of some of those Trump disruptions.

Luke: Absolutely. I think were it to come to it, the European Central Bank would also take the approach of prioritizing the negative shock to growth, the impact on financial conditions and sentiment and ease a little bit more than they otherwise would have done were the EU to be tariffed at some point. But on the other hand, Bob, you know, maybe emerging market central banks are in a slightly different situation. At Banxico, the central Bank of Mexico, for example, it might have struggled to follow through on that maybe developed market playbook given the impact on the currency there. So tell us about the trade offs that those central banks face and how they might likely navigate them.

Bob: Yeah, I think the EM dynamics here are potentially kind of starker. So on the one hand, you know, we might actually be worried that the impact on growth could be larger. You know, many EMs are more dependent on exports and manufacturing as a share of their total economy. So, you know, that might lead you to think they'd be putting a bit more weight pushing through kind of policy support. But on the other hand, Luke, as you know, what kind of mentioned there, so it's harder just for central banks to look through these sort of supply shocks, given inflation is not as well anchored. And on top of this, you know, while any given EM is potentially in this kind of geopolitical tariff spotlight, you know, market pressure and volatility can potentially also rise, you know, making it harder for central banks and fiscal authorities to react and maybe in the same way they might have done without such market constraints. You know, of course, this varies hugely across the EM landscape. I think the good news is, though, there has been decent progress made in tackling the kind of pandemic-era inflation. Many EMs have been able to press ahead with cuts even as the US dollar strengthened. You know, Banxico was able to deliver 100 basis points worth of cuts between August and December last year, despite a roughly 10% fall in the peso over the same time period and a fairly chunky fall that preceded that in the first half of 2024 too. I mean, looking ahead, Asian exporters probably are at some risk of kind of being in the tariff firing line given often sizable trade surpluses. But, you know, underlying inflation remains pretty well behaved in APAC suggesting depreciation, I think, should be more part of the kind of policy response to this terms of trade shock, rather than necessarily being a barrier to it. But yeah, circling back to your general question, you know, I think there's definitely here an issue about maybe the violence with which an exchange rate adjustment could come through if markets conclude a large tariff rise is most likely permanent. I think that could make some central banks in EMs a bit more cautious in kind of how they deliver their easing   kind of over what timescale too.

Paul: And Bob, when it comes to the tariff increases on China, I think it's fair to say that our expectation is that that sticks and only goes up, and that's because Trump's concerns, the US's concerns, go well beyond fentanyl. This is about the size of the trade deficit. It's about sectoral imbalances. It's about national security. It's about the opportunity to raise revenue from tariffs. It's about pursuing a broader economic decoupling, geostrategic rivalry, containing China's economic rise. So how are Chinese policymakers thinking about that challenge both on the trade front - can they offer Trump anything in terms of deal making concessions - or on the other hand, how are they thinking about retaliation? And how would domestic policymakers think about supporting the economy if tariffs keep increasing?

Bob: Yeah. Well, I mean, look, Chinese authorities are certainly well aware of Trump's, displeasure about the size of the bilateral deficit. And clearly Washington itself has become kind of more bipartisan in its kind of ‘tough on China’ politics since Trump's first presidency too. Now I guess, look, we have seen some of the China playbook seemingly aimed at this kind of damage limitation. Should there be further tariffs I think it's likely that the retaliation would continue to be reasonably restrained, but that it would actually be ratcheting up in its kind of desire to push back against the US. It's probably a question about whether they could do more to pressure corporates operating within the US - you know a couple of high profile names there would maybe be Apple - there's a lot of speculation there. Given Elon Musk's role within the US administration about whether Tesla could could again be a kind of potential target to push back and retaliate with. On the other hand, I think there's a few arguments against this. You know, China doesn't want US firms to leave. We just had the latest American Chamber of Commerce survey out in China, kind of generally pointing to foreign direct investment being in a fairly precarious position, with seemingly more firms considering whether to reshore out of China. I probably would expect critical mineral export bans potentially come into force, rather than just restrictions that could have the potential to disrupt supply chains. So maybe this kind of combination of some of these minerals being key for national security and the disruption of supply chains impacting U.S inflation could maybe be other ways the authorities kind of look to retaliate. But, you know, could there be a deal? I think China would potentially be open to a deal, particularly if there were any measures within that to kind of stop further technology restrictions being placed on China. We do have the scheduled US trade review. I doubt that's going to look very favorably on the past phase-one trade deal struck under Trump's previous presidency. You know, at that point China had agreed to increase its purchases of US goods by about $200 billion. It only increased them by about 20 billion. So there is a question here about kind of can China agree to kind of credibly commit to  buying more US policies. And then Paul, you mentioned domestic policy. Well, I do think this is going to lead to more conclusive and immediate easing by China. You know, China's already struggling with low inflation, so it doesn't have to worry about kind of inflationary impact via FX so both monetary and I think fiscal loosening will probably cap the near-term damage. But we do think it's going to be pretty difficult to avoid any damage at all. Currently penciling in around about a 1% hit to the level of Chinese GDP.

Luke: And then finally, Lizzy, I'm wondering between these trade announcements, the early immigration and energy deregulation measures, just the sheer number of executive orders that are being issued so far, what are we learning about Trump's governing style and agenda more broadly, do you think?

Lizzy: Yeah, I mean, it has been a really whirlwind start to his presidency. Certainly, as you mentioned, the number of executive orders really outpaces any modern president’s at this point, and I think just that alone, the thing you can take away is that Trump does have a relatively maximalist view of the power of the presidency. He does have, you know, an instinct to lean on executive orders and particular to his second term, actually, is using emergency powers, quite frequently, for this stage in his presidency to try and accelerate the implementation of his agenda. And I think that's creating some quite interesting effects. On the one hand, you are seeing very rapid progress towards some of his policy aims in areas like immigration in particular, and as I mentioned, we did also see that the tariffs were going to be implemented through emergency powers as well. So there is that element where speed is really coming into this. The flipside of that is that Trump's use of emergency powers may well be something that is is scrutinized in the courts at some stage. There are various legal challenges to some of his early actions already ongoing. And that does create an element of uncertainty around the future of policy. What exactly is going to stick? And what elements of these may be curtailed by the legal system at some stage? So I think there is still quite a high amount of policy uncertainty just because of this relatively unique style that Trump is progressing, because of this reliance on executive orders and emergency powers. But I think the other broader point to make is that one of the reasons he's using these powers is that he is fulfilling his campaign pledges. So he is following through on the policy priorities that he has set out. He is following through on them in the manner in which he had set them out on the campaign trail as well. So this is very much Trump, conforming to the policy priorities he had set out. And I think that means that we do need to be mindful, when he makes these commitments, as significant as they may sound at the time that he actually is trying to follow through on these and therefore it's been a it's been a pretty significant start to his presidency I think. And if he follows through for the next 18 months until the mid-terms or the next two years beyond that, for the full four years, that could end up being a really consequential presidency, both for the US and the for the rest of the world. It's certainly been quite a transformational month or so since he was inaugurated.

Luke: All right. Well, I think that is a pretty good note to end on. So as ever, please like and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts from and all that remains for me is to thank James, Lizzy and Bob for joining us today, and to thank you all for listening. So thanks very much and speak again soon.

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